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POLICE DECEPTION IN INTERROGATION AS A
PROBLEM OF PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY
MargarethEtienne* & RichardMcAdams**
Police lie. It's part of their job. They lie to suspects and others in
hopes of obtaining evidence. These investigative lies cover a wide
web of deceotion.
-Val Van Brocklin'
Police always lie to me so why shouldn't I lie to you?
-United States v. Gardner2
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For a conference like the current one-and we are honored that the late
and great Professor Loewy thought to include us-one usually categorizes
the pressing demands for police reform as a topic for the Fourth Amendment
panel, not the confessions panel. Police reform is usually focused on street
policing: the need to restrain the police to prevent unjustified and
discriminatory street-level enforcement, especially the use of force.3 Our
thesis, however, is that there is an important connection between police
interrogation in the station house and broad issues of police reform. The
connection is legitimacy. Numerous scholars of procedural justice observe
that the police damage their legitimacy, and that of law generally, by
engaging in unjustified and discriminatory stops, frisks, and other uses of

* Carl L. Vacketta Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law at Urbana-Champaign.
** Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Val Van Brocklin, Training Cops to Lie- Pt. 1, Officer.com (Nov. 16, 2009) ("They lie to
suspects and others in hopes of obtaining evidence. These investigative lies cover a wide web of deception
."), https://www.officer.com/home/article/10233095/training-cops-to-ie-pt-1.
2. United States v. Gardner, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (D. Or. 2014) (quoting what the defendant
allegedly said to police).
3. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Procedural Justice: A New Element of Police
Leadership, POLICE EXEC. RES. F. 18-19 (Mar. 2014), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/FreeOn
line_Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%2 0 -%20a%20new%20eleme
nt%20f%20police%20leadership.pdf.
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force.4 Residents who perceive the police as failing to respect their rights and
otherwise treat them fairly are less likely to cooperate with law enforcement
and more likely to offend, so policing becomes counter-productive when it
lacks this legitimacy.' We shall argue that the same can be said about police
deception in interrogation.
Professor Loewy asked: What is the most important issue in the field of
confessions, and while there are several, we believe that an important and
under-explored issue is how pervasive police deception in police-citizen
encounters undermines police legitimacy. We focus on deception in the
interrogation room where it is encouraged and state sanctioned. When the
police are discovered to have lied in the interrogation room about the nature
of the evidence, whether suspects are better off waiving their right to silence
and counsel, or whether the police sympathize with suspects and their reasons
for offending, the interrogator threatens the public's perception of police
legitimacy. Almost all of the prior scholarship critical of police deception in
interrogation makes the point that such deception offends fundamental
principles of democratic governance or runs the risk of inducing false
confessions. At least one scholar considers these arguments but rejects a
utilitarian framing with regard to the costs of deception in favor of a
normative one that focuses on the moral illegitimacy of lies.6 Without
arguing against these points, we wish to identify the distinct problem of
undermining public trust in the police.
We begin by introducing the procedural justice literature in Part I. In
Part II, we explain the varieties and frequency of deception in police
interrogation. Part III describes the resulting inconsistency: that police lying
in interrogation with the goal of closing cases and improving public safety
undermines police legitimacy, producing the unintended consequence of
lowered compliance with law and lowered cooperation with police.
I. THE LITERATURE ON POLICING AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

In response to the civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, after the police
shooting death of Michael Brown, President Obama appointed a Task Force
on 21st Century Policing in December of 2014.' When the Task Force issued
4. See, e.g., Loraine Mazerolle et al., Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review, 9 CAMPBELL
SYSTEMATIC REVS. I, 10-11 (2013) (finding a positive correlation between procedurally just police

practices and police legitimacy).
5. See Tyler, supranote 3, at 9-10.
6.

See Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Public Trust and Police Deception, 11 NE. U. L. REv. 625, 692

(2019) ("Putting aside utility, a moral assessment that understands all lies to be suspect makes the problem
with deceptive interrogation even starker.").
7.

David Jackson, Obama Appoints Task Force on Police Practices,USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/18/obama-21 st-century-policing-task-force-valeri
e-jarrett/20598339/.
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its Final Report' six months later, one of its core principles was the
importance ofproceduraljustice,' which was said to be essential to achieving
the first pillar of effective policing: building trust and legitimacy. 0 The basic
claims of the literature are that (1) "citizens are more likely to comply and
cooperate with police and obey the law when they view the police as
legitimate," and (2) "[t]he most common pathway that the police use to
increase citizen perceptions of legitimacy is through the use of procedural
justice,"" which, as explained below, involves the police treating civilians
fairly and respectfully.1 2 Procedural justice is therefore one means of earning
police legitimacy.' 3 In sum, "[i]f legal authorities exercise their authority
fairly, they build legitimacy and increase both willing deference to rules and
the decisions of the police and courts, as well as the motivation to help with
the task of maintaining social order in the community.""
Consider each of these points in more detail. First, citizens are more
likely to obey the law and cooperate with police when they view the police
as legitimate." The general connection between public compliance with law
and its perceived legitimacy is an old one.1 6 For our purposes, the first
question is: What does it mean for people to perceive the police, specifically,
as legitimate? Psychologist Tom Tyler explains:
Legitimacy is reflected in three judgments. The first is public trust and
confidence in the police. Such confidence involves the belief that the police
are honest, that they try to do their jobs well, and that they are trying to
protect the community against crime and violence. Second, legitimacy
reflects the willingness of residents to defer to the law and to police
authority, i.e. their sense of obligation and responsibility to accept police
authority. Finally, legitimacy involves the belief that police actions are
morally justified and appropriate to the circumstances. i7

8.

See Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, U.S. DEPT. JUST. OFF.

CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. (May 2015), [hereinafter Final Report], https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/

taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
9.

See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS (1975).

10.
11.
12.

Final Report, supra note 8, at 9.
Mazerolle et al., supra note 4, at 8.
Id. at 11.

13. See id.
14. Tom R. Tyler et al., Psychology of ProceduralJustice and Cooperation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4011 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014).

15.

Id. at 4015.

16. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
2013); Herbert C. Kelman, Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A
Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 276 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1969); Richard M. Merelman, Learning andLegitimacy, 60 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 548 (1966).

17. Tyler, supra note 3, at 9.
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To summarize, we might say that legitimacy captures the degree to which
people believe in the police.' 8
The second question is: How do the police earn legitimacy? The term
proceduraljustice captures what the police must do.19 The Task Force's Final
Report summarized the four main elements:
Decades of research and practice support the premise that people are more
likely to obey the law when they believe that those who are enforcing it
have the legitimate authority to tell them what to do. But the public confers
legitimacy only on those they believe are acting in procedurally just ways.
Procedurally just behavior is based on four central principles:
1. Treating people with dignity and respect[;]
2. Giving individuals "voice" during encounters[;]
3. Being neutral and transparent in decision making[;] and
4. Conveying trustworthy motives[.]
Research demonstrates that these principles lead to relationships in which
the community trusts that officers are honest, unbiased, benevolent, and

lawful. 20
The Task Force tied procedural justice to its six pillars of reform, noting
that "[a]t the first session, Building Trust and Legitimacy [the first pillar], the
topic of procedural justice was discussed as a foundational necessity in
building public trust." 2 1 Based on this idea, recommendation 1.1 in the Final
Report states: "Law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian mindset
to build public trust and legitimacy. "22 "Toward that end, police and sheriffs'
departments should adopt proceduraljustice as the guiding principle for
internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with
the citizens they serve."23 Procedural justice is embraced throughout the
report. 24

18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Final Report, supra note 8, at 9-10; see generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE
LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler,
PsychologicalPerspectiveson Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375 (2006) (reviewing
the procedural justice literature); Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged
Sword of ProceduralFairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171 (2005); Mazerolle et al., supra note 4;

Tyler et al., supra note 14.
21. Final Report, supra note 8, at 6.
22.

Id.

23. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 1 ("[L]aw enforcement agencies should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle
for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with rank and file officers and
with the citizens they serve."); id. at 4 ("Internal procedural justice principles should be adopted for all
internal policies and interactions."); id. at 12 ("Adopting procedural justice as the guiding principle for
internal and external policies and practices can be the underpinning of a change in culture and should
contribute to building trust and confidence in the community."); id. at 26 (discussing civilian oversight as
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The third question is: What are the consequences of the police earning
or failing to earn legitimacy via procedural justice? The empirical literature
on procedural justice is not without dissent, 2 5 but it offers strong evidence for
its basic claims, which is that the perception of police legitimacy makes
people more likely to comply with the law 26 and more likely to cooperate
with police. 27 As the Final Report notes, when the community trusts that
officers are "honest, unbiased, benevolent, and lawful[,]" it "feels obligated
to follow the law and the dictates of legal authorities and is more willing to
cooperate with and engage those authorities because it believes that it shares
a common set of interests and values with the police." 2 8 By contrast, the
absence of legitimacy makes people more likely to violate the law and refuse
to cooperate with police. 29 Using procedural justice to produce legitimacy is,
essentially, a crime-control measure.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF POLICE DECEPTION IN INTERROGATIONS

It would be an understatement to say that police officers in the United
States have a legitimacy problem. 30 Their actions and motives are often
a means of implementing procedural justice); id. at 51 ("The goal is not only effective, efficient policing
but also procedural justice and fairness.").
25. One qualification is whether the findings apply in populations outside the United States. See
Justice Tankebe, Public Cooperation with Police in Ghana: Does ProceduralFairnessMatter?, 47
CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1267 (2009); Kristina Murphy, Public Satisfaction with Police: The Importance of
Procedural Justice and Police Performance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 159, 161-162 (2009); Kristina Murphy & Adrian Chemey, Fostering Cooperationwith
the Police: How do Ethnic Minorities in Australia Respond to ProceduralJustice-Based Policing? 44
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 235, 248 (2011); Daniel S. Nagin & Cody W. Telep, ProceduralJustice
and Legal Compliance. 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 5 (2017) (discussing other criticism); Michael D.
Reisig et al., The Construct Validity andRefinement ofProcess-BasedPolicingMeasures, 34 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV. 1005, 1007-08 (2007); Justice Tankebe, Policing, ProceduralFairnessand Public Behaviour:A
Review and Critique, 11 INT'L. JUST. POLICE SCI. MGMT. 8 (2009).
26. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do FairProceduresMatter? The Effect of ProceduralJustice
on Spouse Assault, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 163, 167 (1997); Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming,
ProceduralJustice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders' PsychologicalMechanisms in the
CanberraRISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 553, 555 (2007); Jason
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice andLegitimacy in Shaping Public Supportfor
Policing, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513 (2003); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the
Law? Legitimacy andthe Influence ofLegal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1052-53 (2012);
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
27.

See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 26; JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY? TRUST IN

THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2012); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and DeterrenceEffects in

Counter-TerrorismPolicing:A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & SOC'Y REV. 365, 388-89 (2010);
Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why do People Help the Police Fight Crime
in their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 264 (2008); Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public
Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCH.
PUB. POL. & L. 419 (2011); Kristina Murphy et al., EncouragingPublic Cooperation and Support for
Police, 18 POLICING & SOC'Y 138 (2008).
28. Final Report, supra note 8, at 10.

29.
30.

See id.
See Mazerolle et al., supra note 4, at 10-11.
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questioned, and they are increasingly reviled. 31 Calls to abolish the police, or
defund them, have become commonplace around the country. 32 Police
officers are quitting and retiring in droves, 33 and police departments are
having difficulty replacing them. 34
Many of the instances that have led to the reputational harm suffered by
police officers are self-inflicted. 35 Media reports of officers behaving badly,
indeed criminally, are pervasive. 36 The many allegations of excessive force,
particularly the killings of unarmed African-American men like George
Floyd in Minnesota, 37 have highlighted this problem. Add to this the highly
publicized cases of police corruption, 38 the use of qualified immunity3 9 to
protect police misconduct, and the "blue code of silence" 4 among officers
that prohibits them from divulging the wrongdoing of their fellow officers.41
There is a growing distrust of police officers, and this is not surprising
because one common theme among the explanations for the diminished
reputation and stature of police officers is that they lie and deceive the public
constantly. 42 What the public thinks of police officers matters not simply
because it harms their reputation, but because it impacts the perceived
31. Id.
32. Tracey Meares & Gwen Prowse, Policing as Public Good: Reflecting on the Term "To Protect
and Serve" as Dialogues ofAbolition, 73 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2021) (discussing prominent calls to abolish

and defund the police in academic circles and in the media); see generally Amna A. Akbar, Toward a
RadicalImagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2021).; see also Barry Friedman, Disaggregating

the Police Function, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (2021) (discussing demands by police activists to defund
police departments).
33. Cop Vacancies Overwhelm Short-Staffed Police Departments, WASH. TIMES (May 4, 2021),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/may/4/cops-vacancies-overwhelm-short-staffed-police-de
pa/.
34. Id.
35. See generally Andrew Cohen, Good Cops, Bad Cops, and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of the
Police ProtestMovement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 17, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.or

g/our-work/analysis-opinion/good-cops-bad-cops-and-self-fulfilling-prophecy-police-protest-movement.
36.
37.

See Barry Friedman, Disaggregatingthe PoliceFunction, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (2021).
Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html;

see also 934 People Have

Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpo

st.com/gmphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (tallying the police shootings from 2015 to
2020). Of course, the killings would not include a victim like Floyd who was not shot. Id. The database
includes victims who were armed and unarmed and is not limited by race and ethnicity. Id.
38. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, To Serve and Collect:Measuring Police Corruption, 93 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 593, 593 (2003).
39. See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructingthe RightAgainst Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773,
1776 (2016); Angie Weiss, Note, Excessive Force: Justice Requires Refining State Qualified Immunity
Standards for Negligent Police Officers, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (2020) (arguing for the

elimination of qualified immunity).
40. See Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the
Wagons to ProtectPolice Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 211-14 (2000).
41. Id.
42. See Deborah Young, UnnecessaryEvil: Police Lying in Interrogations,28 CONN. L. REV. 425,

467 (1996).
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legitimacy of their actions and the legitimacy of the laws they are expected
to enforce. 43
Police deception is pervasive. While the brutal killing of George Floyd
was shocking for the world to witness, also shocking was the immediate
explanation given by the Minneapolis Police Department that Floyd had
resisted arrest and had died as a result of medical complications without any
mention of the police officer's role in his death.44 Only after then
seventeen-year-old Darnella Frazer's video went viral did we learn that the
initial police statements were grossly misleading. 45 Body cameras,
surveillance cameras, and cellphone cameras have exposed many police
officer lies. 46 Officers lie so frequently to justify their actions that the term
"testilying" has been coined by officers themselves to describe the giving of
knowingly false official or sworn statements on the witness stand or in
affidavits.7'
As objectionable as these lies are, they are not the type of lies that are
the subject of this Article. Such lies certainly undermine the public's trust in
law enforcement and call into question the legitimacy of the law, but they are
formally condemned and may be dismissed by some as the horrific acts of
rogue or bad cops or as the result of a culture of police misconduct. 48
However, in addition to misconduct, there are many lawful and authorized
deceptive practices that also play a significant role in undermining the law's
legitimacy. 49 Police lie lawfully by pretending to be who they are not in
undercover operations, and most importantly, for our purposes, they lie to
witnesses and suspects with the goal of obtaining evidence. 50 There is no
shortage of authorized lying by police officers in the United States." Because
43.

See Simon-Kerr, supra note 6, at 663-66.

44. See Phillip Bump, How the FirstStatement from Minneapolis Police Made George Floyd's
MurderSeem Like George Floyd'sFault, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

politics/2021/04/20/how-first-statement-minneapolis-police-made-george-floyds-murder-seem-like-geor
ge-floyds-fault/.
45. Eric Levenson, How Minneapolis Police FirstDescribed the Murder of George Floyd and What

We Know Now, CNN (Apr. 21, 2021, 3:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/21/us/minneapolis-policegeorge-floyd-death/index.html [perma.cc/47GU-XKLB]. Another example is the police shooting death of
Laquan McDonald, where the initial reports suggested that McDonald "lunged at police," a statement that
police video later proved false. See Mark Berman, Why DidAuthorities Say Laquan McDonald Lunged at
Chicago Police Officers? WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-

nation/wp/2015/ 11/25/why-did-authorities-say-laquan-mcdonald-lunged-at-chicago-police-officers/.
46.

Renee Graham, Excessive Force, Police Lies and Videotape, BOS. GLOBE (May 25, 2021),

https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/05/25/opinion/excessive-force-police-lies-videotape/.
47.

Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying: The Prosecutors Response to In-Court Police

Deception, in 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 26 (1999) ("The term 'testilying' was coined by police officers
in New York City. It usually refers to perjury committed by police officers. However, it has also been
used to describe other forms of in-court deception.") (footnotes omitted).
48. See id. at 36-37.
49. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-InducedConfession: Riskfactors and Recommendations, 34 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 3, 16-19 (2010).
50. See id. at 16-17.
51. In most European countries police officers are not permitted to lie during interrogations. See id.
at 17.
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this conference panel was asked to explore confessions, we focus here on the
lies police tell in the interrogation room.
The thrust of this Article is not that officers are "natural [born] liar[s,]"
but rather that they are trained and encouraged to lie.52 In order to understand
why certain lies are told, it is helpful to know exactly what police are trying
to accomplish in telling them. 53 Social psychologists Richard Ofshe and
Richard Leo argue that modern interrogations occur in two phases. 4 The
interrogator's goal in the first phase is to render the suspect hopeless about
the evidence against them and the likelihood of conviction; the goal in the
second phase is to elicit a conviction by persuading the suspect that the cost
of denial is less than the cost of confession." Many of the lies that officers
tell during interrogation serve the purpose of accomplishing one of these
goals.56
Criminologist Saul Kassin first described such strategies as
maximization (the exaggeration of the strength of the case against the
suspect) and minimization (the downplaying of the severity of the offense
and the cost-psychological or moral-of confessing to it).57 The leading
interrogation training system, known widely as the "Reid Technique,"5"
teaches deception strategies for maximization and minimization. 59 The
prominence of its authors in the world of law enforcement cannot be
overstated. 60 The Reid Technique of interrogations is the most commonly
used worldwide, 61 and "[v]irtually every police department, sheriff[']s office,
and other law enforcement agency in the United States[-]federal, state, and
local" employ it. 62 The Reid Technique explicitly teaches maximization and
minimization, which explains how ubiquitous these practices are, yet the
training manuals show no effort to prioritize forms of interrogation that help
promote police legitimacy. 63
52. Lance Eldridge, Do Police Officers Lie?, POLICE 1 (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.policel.com/
patrol-issues/articles/do-police-officers-lie-ylVPn4cUmnl7sri/; see Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo,
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DEN. U. L. REV. 979, 985
(1997).
53. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 52, at 985.
54. Id. at 989-90.
55. See id at 990.
56. See id at 986.
57. See Saul Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating
Promisesand Threats by PragmaticImplication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234-35 (1991).
58.

FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION 185-329 (4th ed. 2001).

59.

See Kassin & McNall, supranote 57, at 233-49.

60. See id
61. Dylan French, The Cutting Edge of Confession Evidence: Redefining Coercion and Reforming
Police InterrogationTechniques in the American Criminal Justice System, 97 TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1037

(2019).
62. See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents atRisk?,
60 AM. PSYCH. 215, 215 (2005).
63.

See generally id.
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Reid-trained interrogators are taught to prioritize the immediacy of
getting a confession above long-term concerns.6 4 The Reid interrogation
manual recommends that interrogators begin by expressing total certainty in
the suspect's guilt. 65 But when the existing evidence does not warrant that
level of certainty-as will usually be the case-the only way to credibly
project such unqualified confidence in the suspect's guilt is to exaggerate or
fabricate the evidence against the suspect. Indeed, if the evidence of guilt is
so overwhelming, why is the investigator motivated to secure a confession
using these tactics? Another standard recommendation of the Reid
interrogation manual is to offer a false account of the investigator's motive
for the interrogation-generally to determine not whether the suspect
committed the crime, but why.66
Moreover, interrogators seek to persuade suspects, contrary to fact, that
it is in their interest not to exercise their rights to silence and counsel.67
Suspects almost never have anything to gain by speaking to the police at all,
let alone outside the presence of counsel. In some other forms of deception,
the interrogator seeks to build rapport with suspects by claiming to
sympathize with them, believing they are good people, and professing that
other good people in the same position would have committed the same
crime. 68 All of these deceptions are viewed as part of the job and are standard
operating procedure. 69 Yet the fact that the deception may work in the
moment does not mean that it remains a secret.70 At the conclusion of the
64.

INBAU ET AL., supra note 58, at 249.

65.

See,

e.g.,

FRED E.

INBAU ET

AL., ESSENTIALS

OF

THE REID

TECHNIQUE:

CRIMINAL

INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 127 (2d ed., 2005). "If the suspect perceives that the investigator is

not certain of his guilt, he is unlikely to confess. Consequently, we recommend that the investigator start
the interrogation with a direct statement indicating absolute certainty of the suspect's guilt." Id. at 107.
66. Id. at 108 ("[The transition] statement offers a reason for the interrogation other than eliciting a
confession. (Because the interrogation begins by the investigator telling the suspect that there is no doubt
about his involvement in the crime, the investigator must develop a reason for the interrogation other than
eliciting a confession)."); id. at 196 ("After all, if there is no doubt as to the suspect's involvement in the
crime, the investigator should not require any further statements from the suspect to prove his case.
Therefore . . . [the] transition statement . . . must establish a pretense for the interrogation other than to
elicit a confession.") (emphasis added). The interrogation manual offers these examples of transition
statements: "[B]ecause of [the suspect's] redeeming qualities[, the investigator] feels obligated to offer
the suspect an opportunity to explain his side of the story[ ]"; "[Explain that the only unanswered question
is why the suspect committed the crime[ ]]"; "[Explain that you need to find out what kind of person the
suspect is[ ]]"; "[Explain that you [really] need to establish the extent or frequency of the suspect's
involvement.]" Id. at 197-98.
67. See Susan R. Klein, Lies, Omissions and Concealment: The Golden Rule in Law Enforcement
and the Federal Criminal Code, 39 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1321, 1321-22 (2007) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court, Congress, and the state and federal prosecutors do not want citizens to know their rights
because exercising them would result in fewer solved crimes).
68.

See INBAU ET AL., supra note 58, at 141-57.

69. See OFFICER.COM, supranote 1 ("Police lie. It's part of their job. They lie to suspects and others
in hopes of obtaining evidence. These investigative lies cover a wide web of deception .... ").
70. See generally Geoffery P. Albert & Jeffrey J. Noble, Lies, True Lies, and ConsciousDeception:
Police Officers and the Truth, POLICE Q. (Nov. 17, 2008), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publi

cations/aplert expert reports policeexcessiveforce 2008.pdf.
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.

interrogation, and perhaps in some instances at the conclusion of the case,
these interrogation strategies are revealed to the suspect/defendant and others
as deceptive.7 I The police officer's lies come to be known as lies, not only to
the suspect, but to anyone who listens to the suspect complain about police
deception. According to the procedural justice literature, rude and
discriminatory police encounters on the street influence the attitudes, not only
of those involved in the encounter, but their close family and friends. The
obvious reason is that people share their experiences with the police. There
is every reason to believe the same is true of police deception in interrogation:
an interrogation suspect shares with family and friend the lies that police
deployed in their efforts to secure a confession.7 2
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly affirmed cases
involving police deception, confirming that "stealth and strategy are
necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer."7 3 Accordingly, the
Court has established very few limits to police use of deceitful or stealth
tactics generally.74 As one prosecutor explained, "the variety of deceptive
techniques is limited chiefly by the ingenuity of the interrogator" because the
Supreme Court itself has placed few limits on deception.75 The Court has
interpreted the constitutional Due Process Clause as prohibiting law
enforcement from using interrogation strategies that would lead suspects to
make involuntary or coerced statements. 76 Judges apply the "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine whether "the interrogation was ..
unreasonable or shocking, or if the accused clearly did not have an
opportunity to make a rational or intelligent choice." 7 Few cases rise to this

level.78
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances test has been repeatedly
criticized for its malleability in assessing interrogation practices. 7 9
Describing it as vacuous, one scholar notes that "the totality of the
circumstances approach allows a court to reach any conclusion it wishes by
accentuating the evidence that points in the direction the court wishes to go
and understating the evidence that points in the other direction."8 0 The author
71.
72.

See generally id.
See generally id.

73.
74.

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 396, 372 (1932).
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004).

75.

Lavrie Magid, Deceptive Police InterrogationPractices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L.

REV. 1168, 1168 (2001).
76. See id. at 1172-73.
77. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 661 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. See generally Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
79.

See George C. Thomas III, RegulatingPoliceDeception DuringInterrogation,39 TEX. TECH L.

REV. 1293, 1304 (2007).
80. Id. at 1303-04 (citing Jana Nestlerode, Re-Righting the Right to Privacy: The Supreme Court
and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in CriminalLaw, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 59, 93 (1993)).
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describes a case involving an African-American suspect accused of killing a
white woman in which the suspect was repeatedly questioned by police and
told he was facing the death penalty. 81 During one interrogation, the police
produced a bloody knife with a fingerprint that they falsely told the suspect
matched his print and the prints found at the crime scene. 8 2 The suspect
confessed and the North Carolina Supreme Court deemed the confession
voluntary and admissible. 83
In Illinois v. Perkins, for example, an undercover officer who was
posing as another inmate was placed in a cell with a murder suspect in order
to gain his trust and secure a confession. 84 Evidence of the confession was
later deemed admissible by the Supreme Court, which stated that Miranda is
not violated simply because an officer uses lies to mislead a suspect so long
as those lies "do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion." 85 A police
officer can lie to a suspect by claiming that an associate confessed to the
crime and implicated the suspect, even when that is not the case. 86 The fake
confession of a compatriot is a fairly common, yet old ploy. 87 Deceptive
omissions do not render inculpatory statements involuntary.88 Officers can
omit valuable information in order to obtain a confession. 89 For instance, law
enforcement agents were not required to tell a suspect that his lawyer had
called and instructed police not to talk to the suspect without her present.90
When police officers lie, omit, or misrepresent critical facts during
interrogation, courts have been very reluctant to denounce such strategies for
being unconstitutional absent evidence of coercion or torture.91 Police
deception is deemed unconstitutional when it elicits statements that are said
to be coerced or involuntary.92 As discussed above, many view the
voluntariness test as woefully insufficient, particularly against the risk of
false confessions. 93 Scholars and practitioners have called for various
reforms, including an outright ban on deceitful interrogation practices, 94 an

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1304.
State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 139 (N.C. 1983).
Id. at 154.
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 292 (1990).
Id. at 297.
Frazerv. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969).
See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 226 (1941).
See Jackson, 304 S.E.2d at 152-53.
Moranv. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425-27 (1986).

90.

Id.

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 425.
Id. at 421.
Thomas, supra note 79, at 1298-1304.
94. Amelia C. Hritz, Voluntariness with a Vengeance: The Coerciveness of Police Lies in
Interrogations, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 487, 511 (2017) (proposing a ban on police lying in interrogation
unless warranted by imminent necessity); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REv. 425, 477 (1996) (proposing elimination of lying in police
interrogations); Margaret L. Paris, Faults, Fallacies, and the Future of our Criminal Justice System: Trust,
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exclusionary rule for confessions obtained by deceit, 95 or evidentiary rules
that exclude confessions based on reliability or credibility. 96 Others contend
that the current legal landscape, and its focus on voluntariness, may not be
perfect but strikes a reasonable balance between fairness and public safety
that may, at most, require modest reforms. 97 They argue that limiting police
deception will allow too many guilty suspects to go free. 98
The key point is to acknowledge the potential tradeoff 9" between
arguably reducing the number of true confessions and other societal costs
such as sacrificing procedural legitimacy, as we argue here, or inducing false
confessions as others have argued elsewhere. As Paul Cassell writes, the
Supreme Court has become more explicit, post-Miranda,in recognizing such
concerns.' He notes that the Court now openly describes the Miranda
prophylactic rule against involuntary or coerced statements as a "carefully
crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's
interest."'0 ' Accepting the Court's framing that public safety must be
weighed against other concerns, we argue for a broader conception of public
safety that goes beyond the apprehension of a particular suspect but that also
accounts for the effect of the de-legitimization of the police and of the
criminal law.
III: HOW POLICE DECEPTION UNDERMINES POLICE LEGITIMACY

A. The Problem
Our claim is straightforward: police deception in interrogation
undermines procedural justice.i 0 2 At least when police lies are detected, as
must frequently be the case, they reveal the police to be dishonest and
untrustworthy-exactly the opposite of what procedural justice requires.i03
When a pattern of police deception is sanctioned by courts and other actors
in the criminal justice system, it suggests that the entire system is similarly

Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 3, 44 (1995) (proposing a rule against police lies in
interrogation).
95. See Paul G. Cassell, The False Confession Problem: A Brief Comment on Ofshe, Leo and
Alschuler, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2021) (discussing Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and
Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 974 (1997)).

96. Id. at 1125-27 (commenting on Ofshe & Leo, supra note 52, at 1118).
97. Id. at 1123-24 (describing the tradeoff between treating suspects fairly and convicting fewer
guilty people).
98. Magid, supra note 75, at 1172.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.

Cassell, supra note 95, at 1124.
Id. (quoting Moranv. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986)).
See generally Final Report, supra note 8, at 10.
Id.
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untrustworthy.1' 4 Police lying might help to extract confessions in the short
run but at the cost of damaging police legitimacy in the long run.105 Some
careful consideration is needed to decide whether a given use of deception is
worth the cost.1 06
Given the strong focus on procedural justice in recent years,O? there has
been surprisingly little attention to the role that interrogation might play in
the creation or destruction of police legitimacy.1 08 The Final Report, for
example, mentions stops, frisks, searches, summons, arrests, racial profiling,
and excessive force but not interrogation.1 09 The same omission occurs in
nearly all of the procedural justice scholarship, which is relentlessly focused
on street policing, not what happens in police stationhouses.i" At the same
time, those who criticize police deception in custodial interrogation almost
never do so on the grounds that it undermines procedural justice."i Yet there
seems to be no reason that interrogation practices cannot also earn or
squander police legitimacy.ii 2
The connection between legitimacy and police honesty should be clear
from what we reviewed above.i 3 Recall that Tyler states that legitimacy of
police "involves the belief that the police are honest."" 4 Recall also, that the
Final Report describes the empirical literature as finding legitimacy gains
when "the community trusts that officers are[, among other things,]
honest."" More generally, that report described the requirements for
104. See Simon-Kerr, supranote 6, at 38-43.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Final Report, supra note 8, at 15 ("In recent years, agencies across the county have begun to
institutionalize community trust building endeavors. . . . Joint community and law dialogues and truth
telling, as well as community and law enforcement training in procedural justice and bias, are also
occurring nationally.").
108. Notwithstanding some references to police interrogation, Tyler generally does not
comprehensively apply procedural justice to police interrogation. See Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate
Criminality:The Role of Values, Legitimacy and the MaintenanceofPublic Order, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
267, 288-89 (2014) ("Interrogation is thus similar to policing in general: the most effective method for
achieving the desired behavior is ensuring that the individual is voluntarily motivated to comply. In short,
just as the police need willing cooperation, so do interrogators."). In the last sentence, Tyler seems to
distinguishpolice from interrogators,which might be because he is focusing on terrorism suspects, which
are not carried out in the United States by ordinary local police (although the FBI are still police). See id.
But of course, for most criminal interrogations in the United States, the interrogators are local police. See
id.
109.

See generally Final Report, supra note 8.

110. Along with Tom Tyler, the leading law professor of procedural justice is Tracey Meares, who
discusses the excessive use of "field interrogations" as part of the problem of excessive investigatory stops
under Terry v. Ohio but does not discuss the connection between procedural justice and deceptive station
house interrogations. See Tracey L. Meares, ProgrammingErrors: Understandingthe Constitutionality
ofStop-and-Fristas a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162-63, 178 (2015).
111. But see Simon-Kerr, supranote 6, at 625-31.
112. See id.
113. See generally id.

114.
115.
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procedural justice as including that police "treat[] people with dignity and
respect" and "convey[] trustworthy motives," neither of which is remotely
consistent with police lying to suspects about the nature of the evidence,
suspects' interests in asserting their rights, or whether the police sympathize
with suspects' reasons for committing a crime."'
Other procedural justice material makes the same connection."
Criminologist Kristina Murphy notes:
Police legitimacy has traditionally been conceptualized in the procedural
justice literature as reflecting two judgments. The first is public trust and
confidence in the police. Such confidence involves the belief that the police
are honest and that they try to do their jobs well and are able to protect the
community against crime and violence.I 8

Julia Simon-Kerr is the only scholar we have found to have linked what she
calls perceived legitimacy (which she notes includes procedural, moral, and
pragmatic legitimacy)' with deceptive interrogations in particular.12 She
urges further scholarly research in service of the question: "Does [deception]
in fact affect our perception of the police?"-a question she argues is linked
to public trust and compliance with the law.' 2 ' Indeed, a number of studies
have tried to assess how a community perceives the policy by asking, among
other things, whether the police are honest.' 22 One such study investigated
whether teenage perceptions of the police-including perceptions of police
honesty-are related to a teenager's willingness to report a crime.' 23 The
study found a negative relationship (i.e., that negative perceptions of police
undermine willingness to report crime).1 24 In other words, the study implies
that the strength of an anti-snitching norm is related to beliefs about whether

116.

Id.

117. See generally Kristina Murphy, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Policing, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd eds.,

2014).
118.
119.

Id. at 4028 (emphasis added).
Simon-Kerr, supra note 6, at 665-66.

120.

Id. at 666-77.

121.

Id. at 692.

122. See generallyLing Ren et al., Linking Confidence in Police with the Performanceof the Police:
Community Policing Can Make a Difference, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 55 (2005); David Weisburd et al., Riskfocused Policing at Places: An Experimental Evaluation. 25 JUST. Q. 163 (2008); Tom R. Tyler et al.,
Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2014); Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and
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STUD. 715 (2007).
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Youths' Crime Reporting Intentions, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1063, 1063-66 (2010).
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Id. at 1082, 1086-87.
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the police are, among other things, honest.1 2 5 Note that some racial minorities
are less likely to believe the police are honest.126 This result might have many
causes, but it is not surprising if we assume that racially disproportionate
enforcement includes racially disproportionate interrogation, which tends to
expose individuals to police deception.1 27
B. The Solution(s)
What is to be done? We have not come to a final conclusion as to the
solution, but we will outline the options. First, for those who have advocated
for a complete ban on police deception (at least in interrogation),1 28 our
procedural justice concern is one more reason for a prohibition.1 29
Obviously, if the objection to deception in interrogation is a strong
principle of honest government based on deontological objections to
government deception, then it adds nothing to raise a consequentialist
concern with police deception. 30 However, some of the existing objections
are consequentialist, such as the powerful concern that police deception in
interrogation contributes to the frequency of false confessions."s' In addition,
some have observed the simple idea that police work is made more difficult
when police lose credibility.1 32 Police officers hope to be perceived as sincere
when they state to a potential witness to a serious crime that the police have
no interest in the witness's minor criminal violations that would be disclosed
by answering the police questions or that the police would make sure to
conceal the witness's identity to avoid retaliation by whoever the witness
implicates. But if the witness does not trust the police to keep their promises,
the lack of police credibility will give the witness a strong reason not to
cooperate, impeding their ability to investigate crime.' 33 One can now add to
these two consequentialist concerns-false confessions and the absence of
credibility-the danger that police deception violates procedural justice and
125.

Id. at 1078, 1086-87, 1097.

126. Sutham Cheurprakobkit, Police-Citizen Contact and Police Performance: Attitudinal
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confessions is, therefore, the investigator's use of improper, coercive interrogation techniques."); see
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(1989).
133. Id. at 824.

36

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:21

undermines police legitimacy. 3 4 Possibly, the gains from police deception
are not ever worth the costs. 35
We are not so sure. Others who have criticized the pervasive use of
deceptive interrogation tactics have, nonetheless, acknowledged that there
are some specific cases where their use is justified.1 36 For example, if the
police have exhausted the non-interrogation means of gathering evidence and
other means of interrogation, it may be that deception is the only tool that can
work. If a murderer or rapist will otherwise escape criminal liability, then the
benefits of certain types of deception in certain circumstances plausibly
outweigh its costs. On this view, the problem is that the police currently
proceed as if there are no costs to deception and use the tactic pervasively
and indiscriminately without regard to the severity of the crime, the likely
success of non-deceptive interrogation, or the availability of other sufficient
evidence to convict. 3 7 The police use deception reflexively, as a first step,
and not deliberately, as a last step. At a minimum, we propose moving to a
more calculated determination that takes into account the costs and benefits
of deceptive practices before such practices are employed. We note that the
results of the cost-benefit analysis we support would vary depending on the
nature of the deception and the likelihood that it would be uncovered, the
seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the suspect and the
alternatives at the interrogator's disposal.' 38
If the current failure to conduct any such a calculus is, in part, the nature
of the problem, Christopher Slobogin has proposed an intermediate solution
(for reasons other than procedural justice), that police should be able to use
deception in interrogation only under certain circumstances: roughly, after
arrest when there is a judicial determination of probable cause to believe the
suspect has committed a felony.' 3 9 Such a rule would forbid deception prior
to arrest, as in non-custodial interviews with suspects.14 0 The rule would ban
deception in misdemeanor investigations. 141 One might also favor prohibiting
deceptive practices in cases involving juveniles and other vulnerable
populations, who are particular risks for false confessions, as others have

134.
135.

See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 131, at 493-94; Stuntz, supra note 132, at 824.
See, e.g., Paris, supra note 128, at 43-44.
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137. Id. at 790.
138. See id. at 796.
139. See id. at 803-04, 810 (recommending and discussing a judge's ability to approve police
deception); Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1277-79 (2007)
(proposing probable cause as a prerequisite for allowing deceptive interrogation tactics).
140. See Slobogin, supra note 136, at 811-12 (explaining that probable cause would be required to
use deceptive police tactics).
141. See Slobogin, supra note 139, at 1279.
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argued. 4 2 We note the additional concern that police officers who use their
position of authority and their experience to trick a suspect with diminished
capacity may cause more public revulsion that greatly endangers police
legitimacy. 143
The need for a judicial determination would not leave the issue of
probable cause entirely in the hands of police who may overestimate the
probability of the suspect's guilt.1 44 Judicial review, however, is complicated
by the problem of defining deception.1 45 Even if courts can effectively define
deception, there are limits to judicial competence that come into play.1 4 6 For
example, even in serious cases where the suspect is a competent adult, and
there are no non-interrogation avenues for evidence, it might be better that
police refrain from deception until they have made some efforts at
interrogation without deception.1 47 But, experienced interrogators might be
better than judges at defining what constitutes some efforts. 48 So if deception
is ever to be permitted, in addition to some judicially enforced limits on
deception, as Slobogin advocates, it might be desirable for police
departments to adopt policies limiting when deception can be used.1 49
One expects that police would resist any such limitations-as they resist
other reforms-but the argument made here is addressed directly to police.
Although police detectives might quarrel with the unflattering depiction of
Saul Kassin's statement decades ago that an interrogator is "a salesman, a
huckster as thieving and silver-tongued as any man who ever moved used
cars or aluminum siding,""' they understand, as salespeople do, that

142. See Barry C. Feld, PoliceInterrogationof Juveniles: An EmpiricalStudy ofPolicy and Practice,
97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 308 (2006) ("[P]rolonged interrogation[-]especially in conjunction
withyouthfulness, mental retardation, or other psychological vulnerabilities[-]is strongly associated with
eliciting false confessions.") (footnote omitted); see also Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from
the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How StandardPolice Interrogation Tactics Can Produce
Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
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147. See Slobogin, supra note 136, at 803 (advocating that deceptive methods are used only against
authenticated suspects).
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credibility matters. 5 2 If the common wisdom within a community is not to
trust a single word a police officer says, the police have perhaps won some
interrogation battles but lost the war for legitimacy.' 53 There is no point in
expensive and time-consuming efforts to gain the trust and respect of the
community if the police are at the same time engaged in a reasonably
well-known practice (though not at first to all suspects) of pervasively lying
to suspects. If police deception is a necessary evil, then it must be treated like
one and employed with parsimony and judgment.1 54
Without resolving the exact place to draw the line, we believe that the
costs of police deception require that a new line be drawn, one making police
deception in interrogation less common, if it must exist at all.1 55

152. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing how a lack of credibility impedes
police ability to investigate).
153. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text (discussing how police legitimacy is linked to
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